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The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #02324-85 3 May 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH:

Chairman, National Intelligence Council X

Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM:

Fritz W. Ermarth

National Intelligence Officer for USSR

SUBJECT:

Invitation to Address the IISS Annual Conference

- Several months ago Bob O'Neill, Director of the IISS, invited me to be one of four keynote or plenary speakers to the Institute's annual conference, which will occur in Berlin in September. I am asked to speak on Soviet doctrinal tends. The other three speakers invited are General Bernard Rogers, Senator Sam Nunn, and Karsten Voigt (FRG/SPD foreign policy spokesman). General Rogers has accepted.
- 2. I told Dr. O'Neill that I would like to make the presentation, but would have to seek official approval and would get back to him. Needless to say, it is flattering to be invited again (I did this in 1978) and professionally worthwhile to me to stay alive in the memory banks of the IISS membership.
- IISS conferences are, of course, unclassified; they are relatively open; and plenary sessions are on the record. My presentation text would be cleared for security here and for policy with NSC/State/OSD, as would, presumably, Bernie Rogers'.
- Precisely because the IISS is an influential forum whose organization and membership are not, on the whole, very much in sympathy with the official US perspective on the Soviet Union, its military doctrines, and force developments, I believe I can make a constructive contribution by giving this presentation. This can be done entirely on an



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unclassified basis, relying on Soviet military literature and well-known facts about Soviet forces and operational concepts. The novelty is weaving them together.

- 5. I would propose a paper addressing this outline:
 - I. The architecture of Soviet strategy
 - A. Homeland defense
 - B. Eurasian regional dominance
 - C. Strategic nuclear offensive support for A and B
 - D. Distant power projection
 - II. The historic stability of this structure, its modification over the years, its implementation in forces.
 - III. The European component of Soviet strategy.
 - A. Offensive dominance
 - B. Preparation for nuclear and non-nuclear scenarios
 - C. Soviet efforts to maintain offensive dominance in the face of NATO's doctrinal shifts and force modernization
 - D. The military aim of decoupling
 - IV. The political aims and content of Soviet military strategy.
 - A. War and peace aims are the same: to undermine US/NATO strategy and decouple US power and guarantees from European security, preferrably through peacetime power politics against the backdrop of Soviet military strength.
 - B. The role of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda (including arms control policy) in supporting the basic aims also sought by Soviet military strategy.
 - V. The Soviet view of the present strategic relationship: Why the Soviets assert that a "reasonable balance" has been attained and what this means.
- 6. If you approve my giving this presentation, a draft text would be ready in early July and it could easily be cleared in a month.

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- 7. In my opinion, it would be wise for the USG to grab this particular podium. General Rogers will necessarily devote very little attention to the Soviet side. Most substitutes for me whom I can imagine IISS inviting on their own are likely to give interpretations which miss the essence of the matter and are less supportive of US policy interests.
- 8. Should you have reservations about my doing this because of my Agency affiliation, I strongly suggest that you raise with Bud McFarlane and/or Secretary Weinberger the early selection of a good substitute from the Executive Branch, whom the IISS could not in good conscience turn down. Fred Ikle or Richard Perle might be willing; I could help prepare the paper for them if necessary. Bill Odom would be the best on substance; he would present essentially the same message that I propose.

9. Recommendation: That you approve my preparation and delivery of this paper.

Fritz W. Ermarth

cc: D/PA

D/OS

D/SOVA

NIO/SP

NIO/EUR

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CONCURS

DOES NOT CONCUR

Date

Chairman, NIC

Does Not concur

6 MAY 1985

Date

Director of Central Intelligence

Date

STAT

I HAVE NO OBJECTIONS

1 3 MAY 1985

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

23 Tavistock Street London WC2E 7NQ Telephone 01-379 7676 Cables: Strategy London WC2

February 5, 1985.

Mr. Fritz Ermath,

STAT

Dear Fris

I am writing to invite you to be the opening plenary speaker at the 27th Annual Conference of the IISS, to be held at the Hotel Intercontinental, West Berlin, 12-15 September 1985. The theme of the Conference is "Power and Policy: Doctrine, the Alliance and Arms Control." The Conference will be focusing on the operational doctrine debate within the Western Alliance, and the implications of doctrinal choices for Alliance cohesion.

At the outset of the Conference we must have a clear idea of how Soviet operational doctrines are developing, particularly as they relate to possible employment against the Alliance in Western Europe. Treatment of nuclear issues should thus focus on doctrine for the European theatre (including, of course, those aspects of Soviet thinking about the use of intercontinental-range systems which seem particularly relevant to NATO defence). In addressing conventional force questions, you should feel free to treat both the central front and the flanks, but we would appreciate a focus on those issues which have figured prominently in recent debates, such as employment of OMGs, the growth and re-organisation of Soviet aviation, a possible new threatre command for Europe, and so on. We would be interested most particularly in your views on Soviet measures to offset current and projected developments in Western operational doctrines and force structure, particularly those associated with the Rogers plan.

A draft programme for the Conference is attached. Your paper is scheduled for the evening of Thursday 12 September. You will, no doubt, add your own further thoughts on the topic and I would be glad to have your ideas.

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Mr. Fritz Ermath

February 5, 1985.

The Institute will, of course, pay all your travel expenses (at economy rates) and your accommodation in Berlin for the duration of the Conference. An honorarium of \$200 will also be available. Your paper will be produced, as usual, after the Conference in the Adelphi Papers series.

So that we might be able to reproduce the papers on time for Conference use, it would be greatly appreciated if we could have your draft here in Lodon by 9 August. The paper should be approximately 5-6,000 words in length (certainly not longer).

I do hope very much that you may be able to accept this invitation. I am sure that you will need no persuasion that our theme is an important one. The opening plenary is of key importance to the success of the Conference and we could not think of a better person to deliver it than yourself.

Looking forward to your response.

Robert O'Neill

Director

Encl.

IISS ANNUAL CONFERENCE - 12-15 September 1985

POWER AND POLICY: DOCTRINE, THE ALLIANCE AND ARMS CONTROL

Conference Chairman Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (invited)

Opening Address Defence Minister Manfred Woerner

(invited)

PLENARY SESSIONS

1. The Evolution of Soviet Doctrine Dr Fritz Ermath (invited)

2. NATO Doctrines, Present and Future General Bernard Rogers (invited)

3. Strategic Policy Options and
Implications for Arms Control,
Stability and East-West Relations Mr Karsten Voigt (invited)

4. Strategic Choices and Alliance
Cohesion Senator Sam Nunn (invited)

COMMITTEES

- 1. NATO Doctrine and National Operational Priorities: The Central Front and the Flanks
- 2. The Roles of Strategic and Theatre Nuclear Forces in NATO Strategy
- 3. The Impact of NATO Doctrinal Choices on the Policies and Strategic Choices of Warsaw Pact States
- 4. Strategic Choices: Their Roles in NATO's Defence Planning and Force Modernization
- Problems of Over-extension: Reconciling NATO Defence and Out-of-Area Contingencies
- 6. Arms Control Implications of NATO and Warsaw Pact Doctrines